This chapter offers a selective survey of the gravity equation (GE) in international trade. This equation started in the Sixties as a purely empirical proposition to explain bilateral trade flows, without little or no theoretical underpinnings. At the end of the Seventies, the GE was "legitimized" by a series of theoretical articles that demonstrated that the basic GE form was consistent with various models of trade flows. Empirical applications of GE expanded to cover a variety of issues, such as the impact of regional trade agreements, national borders and currency unions on trade, as well as the use of the equation to sort out the relative merit of alternative trade theories. A new wave of studies is now concentrating on the general equilibrium properties of the GE and finer econometrics points. The renewed interest of the academic profession in the development of the GE is undoubtedly driven by the equation's empirical success.
I. INTRODUCTION
International economics and international business have common interests but somewhat different research agendas. The former emphasizes cross-border trade and capital flows, whereas the latter looks predominantly at foreign direct investment. Part of this difference results from the emphasis that scholars in international business place on the study of the multinational firm and part is due to intellectual specialization. It is worth recalling that the yearly flows of international trade are a large multiple of the yearly flows of foreign direct investment, while the stock of foreign direct investment has only recently approached annual trade flows (see Figure 1 ). Furthermore, total real exports have grown faster, on average, than the world real GDP since the mid-1980s (see Figure   2 ). Finally, it is widely believed that exports are an engine of economic growth; see Krueger (2006) . For all these reasons, international trade economists spend a great deal of time and resources understanding and explaining trade flows. With this brief background, I can state the objectives and outline of the chapter.
The objective is to explain trade flows in terms of the gravity equation (GE) . The reason for focusing on GE is two fold. The first is that GE, unlike other frameworks, has had great empirical success in explaining bilateral trade flows. For a long time, however, GE was a child without a father in the sense that it was thought to have no theoretical support. Since the late 1970s, this state of affairs has changed radically. Now, the gravity equation has strong theoretical support and can be derived from a variety of models of international trade. The second is that GE can be used to sort out alternative hypotheses of international trade.
In its simplest form, the gravity equation (GE) explains flows of a good between pairs of countries in terms of the countries' incomes, distance and a host of idiosyncratic factors--such as common border, common language, and common money--that enhance or reduce bilateral trade flows:
(1)
where M ijk denotes that the k good is exported by country i and imported by country j, Y ik and Y jk are expenditures on the k good by the two countries, and d is distance; A and αs are coefficients, and U is a well behaved error term. The vector of idiosyncratic factors has been omitted in (1) because these factors are more control variables than theoretically derived variables. Aggregating over all k goods, the GE of a given product can be transformed into a GE of total exports of country i:
where the k subscript has been suppressed and Y is the country's income (for example, nominal gross domestic product or GDP). The implications of GE -which we develop and discuss below--are such that α 1 and α 2 are positive and in some instances equal to one and that α 3 is negative. Typically, equation (2) is specified in log linear form and estimated either with cross-section or panel data. In the latter case, a time subscript τ is added, except for the time-invariant physical distance:
where ln stands for the natural logarithm, ln(A 0 ) = α 0 and u ijt = ln(U ijτ ). The vector of idiosyncratic factors, F ij , has also been added to equation (3). These factors are typically measured as dummy variables that acquire the value of one for the existence of the phenomenon and zero for its absence. The coefficients α 1 through α 3 are interpreted as elasticities or as percentage changes in bilateral trade for one percentage change in income and distance. The coefficient α 4 is positive if the factor is trade enhancing (e.g., common language) and negative if trade reducing (e.g., terrorism).
In the following section I will explore different models of international trade from which GE can be derived, ranging from models of complete specialization and identical consumers' preferences (Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985; Deardorff 1998) to models of product differentiation in a regime of monopolistic competition (Helpman 1987) to hybrid models of different factor proportions and product differentiation (Bergstrand 1989; Evenett and Keller 2002) to models of incomplete specialization and trading costs (Haveman and Hummels 2004) .
II. TRADE THEORY AND THE GE

Complete specialization
Specialization is at the heart of trade theory; it is complete or deepest when each country specializes in the production of its own output and consumers purchase the output of each country according to identical and homothetic preferences. Furthermore, trade occurs without friction, meaning that it is not impeded either by transport costs, tariffs or tariffequivalent border obstacles. This idealized set-up serves the purpose of creating a benchmark of maximum trade flows. Each country imports and consumes a share of the goods produced by all other countries, as well as a share of its own output. These shares are the same for all countries. Consider, for example, two countries, country 1 and country 2, producing differentiated products by country of origin. Country 1 will export its own good to country 2 in the amount of M 12 = b 1 Y 2 , where b 1 = marginal propensity to import good 1 in country 2. Country 1 will also sell b 1 Y 1 amount of the good it produces to domestic consumers. Note that the propensity to consume good 1 is the same across all consumers regardless of location. Income of country 1 is the sum of purchases by consumers located in country 1 and consumers located in country 2, i.e., relative to the frictionless world of equation (4):
Monopolistic competition and intra-industry trade
Complete specialization is the natural outcome of models of monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale, which are at the core of the so-called New Trade Theory (Helpman and Krugman 1985 The key testable implication is that intra-industry trade responds positively, not only to the level of aggregate income, but also to the degree of income similarity among trading partners. More specifically, for a group of developed countries, such as those belonging to the OECD, Helpman develops and tests the following equation: would approach unity and the expression in the squared brackets would tend to zero. As countries in the group become less asymmetric in income, the expression in squared brackets rises. Thus, the more symmetric the group's countries are, the larger is the trade volume within the group. David Hummels and James Levinsohn (1995, pp. 804-5) test a slightly modified (6) applied to country pairs: cent for Ireland. 2 The GE from a model of product differentiation and monopolistic competition was also developed by Bergstrand (1989) . In Bergstrand's, there is the added feature that bilateral
where M i+j is the volume of trade in the country pair and Y i+j is the income in the twocountry region. The first term on the right-hand side of (7) captures the impact of the country pair's income on bilateral trade. The income variable is corrected by the symmetry factor (1 -b i 2 -b j 2 ). As countries become more similar the impact of income on bilateral flows rises. The second term of equation (7) captures the share of the pair's income in world income. The empirical results show that (7) works just as well for non-OECD as it does for OECD countries. Since intra-industry trade is small among developing countries, one must infer that there is more than differentiated goods in driving trade flows.
Hecksher-Ohlin Equation (4) has also been derived from the perspective of the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) theory of comparative advantage (Deardorff 1998 ). This theory, as every undergraduate student of international economics and business knows, underscores the importance of a country's relative resources in determining its comparative advantage. In the H-O world, goods are homogeneous and perfect competition prevails. H-O predicts that a country will export those goods that require a relative intensive use of the endowed input.
Capital-rich countries enjoy a lower cost of capital relative to wages and tend to export capital-intensive products; the reverse is true for labor-rich countries. There is also a trade responds negatively to the size of the population of the two trading partners. accurately what their total choices will be by using expected values. In general, these expected values will be appropriate averages of the wide variety of outcomes that are in fact possible in the model." 3 An alternative route to arrive at (4), using the H-O framework, would consider complete specialization emanating from large differences in factor composition, a theme on which we will return later in the paper.
Incomplete specialization
So far, we have seen the gravity equation from complete specialization models. These models predict that a producer of a given good will supply all consumers or all countries.
Consequently, we should note that the matrix of bilateral trade is full in the sense that an exporter will satisfy all importers. What is the evidence on this score? Ideally, as
Haveman and Hummels point out (2004, p. 213), we would want to have data showing the complete range of varieties produced and cases when a country produces a good but 3 Even though production costs are the same across countries, capital-rich countries will produce a disproportionate share of capital-intensive goods, and the opposite for laborintensive countries. Thus, although factor prices are equalized, with consumers having identical and homothetic preferences, the main H-O prediction holds (Helpman 1989, p. 124) .
fails to export it. This information is unfortunately not available. The procedure adopted by Haveman and Hummels is to define a good at a 4-digt SITC category, compute the number of exporters of good k for each importer and then divide this number by the total number of exporters of good k. Under complete specialization, this number should be equal to one. Instead, these authors find that 27 per cent of the sample has zero values and 58 per cent of importers buy from fewer than 10 per cent of available exporters. 4 In sum, the foundation upon which complete specialization is based may be a bit shaky. The next step involves deriving the gravity equation from the alternative perspective of incomplete specialization, an environment in which consumers buy a sub-set of available varieties or there are multiple suppliers of homogeneous goods.
Simon Evenett and Wolfgang Keller (2002) derive two GE-like testable models from incomplete specialization. In the first one, the setting is H-O but restricted to two goods, two factors, and two countries. The restriction is essential because in a more plausible many-country environment bilateral trade flows with multiple suppliers (in a frictionless world) would be indeterminate. The two countries have different capital to labor ratios and export different goods. Their bilateral exports will depend not only on income, as in equation (4), but also on the share of the two goods in production (see equation 3 in Evenett and Keller): see Evenett and Keller (2002, pp. 286-7) . We shall return to this point in the next section.
and 438 4-digit sectors.
III. THE EMPIRICAL GE
The GE has been very successful in explaining actual trade patterns; in fact, it is considered to be state of the art for the determination of bilateral trade (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, p. 1384; Feenstra et al. 2001, p. 431) . There is a voluminous literature on the empirical GE going back to the early 1960s, far too big to be reviewed within the space of a chapter. The approach I shall follow is to select some themes that are germane to the theory presented above.
GE and alternative trade theories
Among the various uses of the GE, one of the most promising is to employ it so as to discriminate among alternative theories of international trade. This is what Feenstra et al (2001) do. These authors fit a GE of the form of equation (3) presented by the authors rejects the statistical equality of the two alpha coefficients. The estimated α 1 (exporter's income) rises as one moves from homogeneous to referencepriced goods to differentiated goods. In the homogeneous category, α 1 is below α 2 , whereas the opposite is true for differentiated goods. In sum, the evidence is strongest for H 2 , that is the environment where barriers to entry are highest, such as in sectors like mining and steel.
Complete vs. incomplete specialization
There is some evidence that the data fit better models of incomplete specialization, as implied by our equation (8) and (9), than models of complete specialization, as implied by equation (4). To test this proposition, Evenett and Keller (2002) apply the GrubelLloyd index to construct an index of intra-industry trade using 1985 trade data at the 4-digit SITC level from 58 (primarily industrial) countries. As already noted, the intraindustry index is bound between zero (total absence of intra-industry trade) and one (trade takes only the form of intra-industry varieties). In practice, the index tends to be low. In the authors' sample, the distribution of the index is skewed towards zero, with 78 per cent of the sampled country pairs lying below the value of 0.05, which is taken by the authors as the demarcation line between homogeneous and differentiated production.
Equation (4) is applied to data whose intra-industry index falls below 0.05. The unit coefficient on the incomes of the two trading partners is rejected by the data. We recall that equation (4) could have been generated from either differentiated varieties produced under increasing returns to scale or by homogenous produced in an H-O world with large differences in factor endowments. Empirically, the alternative of incomplete specialization fares much better. Equations (8) and (9) are tested with data whose intraindustry trade index exceeds 0.05. For equation (9), the coefficients of the income variables should be positive (but below unity) and rising as the Grubel-Lloyd index rises.
The findings do not reject these patterns. Equation (8) 
National borders and multilateral resistance
National borders are a discontinuity of distance and an impediment to international trade.
Costs take a jump at the border. First, there are transaction costs due to customs clearance and formalities. Furthermore, the border is a delimiter of differences in legal systems and practices, languages, networks, competitive policies, and monetary regimes. Finally, national authorities use the border to discriminate against foreign producers by applying tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions. Border frictions are more difficult to quantify than distance-related frictions.
The economic size of the national border is at center stage in McCallum (1995) who fits a modified form of equation (3) The authors arrive at a testable equation that resembles equation (5) above:
.
There are two differences between (10) change comes from the fact that the hypothesized utility has a constant-elasticity of substitution, σ, between goods. This elasticity has been estimated to exceed one; the authors assume it to be five. In sum, an increase in multilateral resistance relative to bilateral resistance raises bilateral trade. The rest of (10) matches (5). This is because (10), like (5), was derived under the assumption of complete specialization.
, where d ij is, as before, distance between the country pair, and δ ij = 1 if the two trading regions are located inside a given border or δ ij = 1 plus the tariff rate and if the two regions are located on opposite sides of a border. Substituting the definition of t ij in (10), we obtain
-(1-σ) ln(P j ). relations; yet, their border represents a considerable obstacle to further integration. To have a more complete picture of the border effect, we need to extend the work to other countries, both in the North and the South.
North and South trade
Our last empirical topic deals with the application of GE to trade flows among developed countries (North), developing countries (South), and between the two sub-groups (North-South).
5 See the authors' table 2. The estimate of (1-σ)ln(δ USCan ) is -1.65. Given that σ is set to 5, For this purpose, I shall use the WTA by Statistics of Canada, which consists of 215,500
annual observations on bilateral imports, in U.S. dollars, covering 143 countries over the period 1980 to 2003. Details of the data set can be obtained by consulting the Indiana University CIBER Website (http://www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/research.cfm). The testable equation is a modified version of (3)
α 5 ln P it + α 6 ln P jt + u ijt .
Specification (12), unlike (3), imposes the restriction that the elasticity of trade flows with respect to income is the same for exporting and importing countries. In addition, (12) includes per-capita income and time-varying multilateral resistance factors P it and P jt . Bergstrand (1989) shows the relevance of per-capita income, which proxies for factor intensities in the GE. The multilateral trade factors were discussed in connection with the empirical work on the border effect. Unlike Anderson and Van Wincoop, I will account for these factors by the simpler procedure of using time-varying country-specific dummies (that is, country dummies interacting with years). A more comprehensive treatment of the econometric issues underlying the GE estimation with panel data can be found in Fratianni and Oh (2007) .
Vector F includes affinity variables that are trade-enhancing. These fall into three categories: geographic affinity (common land border), cultural affinity (common ln(δ USCan ) = 0.4125 and δ USCan = 1.51 (note that exp(0.4125) = 1.51).
language, common colonizer, and colonial relationship), and institutional affinity (RTA membership and common currency). RTAs work like clubs and give members privileged access to a geographic area. There is a big literature on whether RTAs, on balance, create trade or divert trade against outsiders; see Fratianni and Oh (2007) . Regionalism is defined in terms of eleven separate RTAs, covering 40 per cent of world trade; for a list of the RTAs, see Table 1 below. Since the RTAs have the potential to divert trade, (12) includes also an inter-regional dummy that is equal to one when the trading partners belong to different RTAs; otherwise it is zero. Trade diversion implies a negative coefficient.
Measurement and sources of the variables of equation (12) are shown in the Appendix. Table 1 [Insert Table 1 here]
Estimates of equation (12) are presented in Table 2 . Income and distance are powerful forces of bilateral trade and appear to be stable across different groups of countries. The elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to GDP is between 1.10 and 1.20, the differences between North and South being quite minor. The elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to distance is -.99 for the North and -1.11 for the South (and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level), suggesting that trading costs are higher for developing countries than developed countries. To have an appreciation of the quantitative importance of distance, consider that the average of the log of distance is about 8.2 and that the average of the log of bilateral imports is 8.6.
Since the distance elasticity is around unity, distance alone, on average, "destroys" almost the entire value of bilateral flows. Distance, we recall, captures more than mere transportation costs. The consensus is that the bulk of trading costs are due to tradereducing factors such as differences in legal systems, administrative practices, market structures, networks, languages and monetary regimes; see Grossman (1998, pp. 30-31) .
Membership to an RTA raises bilateral trade flows much more for the South and the North-South than for the North. On the other hand, the relatively low frequency of RTAs in the South may weaken the reliability of the estimates for South-South and medium and low-income countries.
North-South. 7 The inter-regional dummy is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that RTA membership has not hampered trade between countries that belong to two different trade clubs.
The relationship between bilateral trade and a common currency appears to be unstable: it is strongly positive in the South, but statistically insignificant in the North.
Again, as it is true for the RTAs, the reliability of these estimates may reflect the fact that frequency of currency unions in the South is very low both in an absolute sense and in relation to the frequency in the North. At this point, it is best to remain cautious on the quantitative importance of a common currency on trade. The initial estimates of Rose (2000) that countries with a common currency trade three times as much as countries with different currencies (and fluctuating exchange rates) has been met with some skepticism; see, for example, the comments to Rose by Persson (2001) .
Geographical affinity, proxied by a shared land border, is trade enhancing for the South but not for the North. The implicit assumption that a shared border leads to more trade is based on the presumption that neighboring countries have friendly relations and tend to cooperate more than distant countries. The alternative that close countries tend to be unfriendly and protect the home market more than distant countries cannot be dismissed, certainly not through reading of history. Cultural affinity, proxied by a common language, common colonizer and a shared colonial relationship expand trade across all sub-groups. Common language is more trade enhancing in the North than the South, while the opposite holds for colonial ties.
In sum, the results of equation (12) should be judged as a success for the explanatory power of the gravity equation.
[Insert Tables Notes: a The eleven RTAs are: the European Union, the North American Free Trade Association, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Southern Common Market, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Community of Nations, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, the Central American Common Market, the Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement, the South Pacific Region Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, and the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement; for more details see Fratianni and Oh (2007) .
b The list of monetary unions encompass the following areas: the U.S. dollar, the East Caribbean dollar, the Australian dollar, the Rihal, the euro, the CFA, the Franc, the Indian Rupee, and the Rand; for more details see Fratianni (2006) . Note: Equation (2) has been estimated with time-varying importing country fixed effects, which are not reported. Superscripts *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Dependent variables and GDP are in nominal dollar values.
